Check whether a domain is DNSSEC signed and validating: see the DS records at the parent, the DNSKEY set, key tags, DS digest matches, RRSIG validity dates and the resolver AD flag, with plain explanations of algorithm numbers and digest types.
It checks:
www.example.com, it finds the zone from the SOA record and checks that.cd=1) so you can see the records the resolver rejected.It doesn't verify RRSIG signatures cryptographically itself; for that it relies on Cloudflare's validation (the AD flag and SERVFAIL). It doesn't walk the chain above the parent zone, check NSEC or NSEC3 denial proofs, or query each authoritative name server separately, so a problem on only one of your name servers can be missed. Answers can come from Cloudflare's cache.
The number in DNSKEY, RRSIG and DS records names the signing algorithm. The signing and validation columns are the current recommendations in the IANA registry. RFC 9904 (November 2025) obsoleted RFC 8624 and moved these recommendations into the IANA registries.
| Number | Mnemonic | Algorithm | Use for signing | Use for validation | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | DELETE | Delete DS | – | – | Only valid in CDS and CDNSKEY records, where it asks the parent to remove the DS records (RFC 8078). Not a signing algorithm. |
| 1 | RSAMD5 | RSA/MD5 (deprecated) | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | |
| 3 | DSA | DSA/SHA1 | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | |
| 5 | RSASHA1 | RSA/SHA-1 | MUST NOT | RECOMMENDED | RFC 9905: MUST NOT be used for new DNSKEY, RRSIG or DS records. Validator software must still support it, but resolver operators must treat it as unsupported, so a zone signed only with it can be treated as insecure. |
| 6 | DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 | DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | |
| 7 | RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 | RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 | MUST NOT | RECOMMENDED | RFC 9905: MUST NOT be used for new DNSKEY, RRSIG or DS records. Validator software must still support it, but resolver operators must treat it as unsupported, so a zone signed only with it can be treated as insecure. |
| 8 | RSASHA256 | RSA/SHA-256 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | |
| 10 | RSASHA512 | RSA/SHA-512 | NOT RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | |
| 12 | ECC-GOST | GOST R 34.10-2001 (deprecated) | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | Retired by RFC 9906. |
| 13 | ECDSAP256SHA256 | ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | Cloudflare calls algorithm 13 its preferred choice. |
| 14 | ECDSAP384SHA384 | ECDSA Curve P-384 with SHA-384 | MAY | RECOMMENDED | |
| 15 | ED25519 | Ed25519 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | |
| 16 | ED448 | Ed448 | MAY | RECOMMENDED | |
| 17 | SM2SM3 | SM2 signing algorithm with SM3 hashing algorithm | MAY | MAY | |
| 18 | MLDSA44 | ML-DSA-44 | MAY | MAY | |
| 23 | ECC-GOST12 | GOST R 34.10-2012 | MAY | MAY | |
| 253 | PRIVATEDNS | private algorithm | MAY | MAY | |
| 254 | PRIVATEOID | private algorithm OID | MAY | MAY |
Numbers 4, 9, 11, 123–251 and 255 are reserved; 2 (Diffie-Hellman) and 252 (indirect keys) are not used for zone signing; 19–22 and 24–122 are unassigned.
The digest type in a DS record says which hash of the child's DNSKEY it holds. RFC 6840 section 5.2 says validators ignore DS records with digest types they don't support, the same way they ignore unsupported algorithms.
| Number | Digest | Use for DS records | Use for validation | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Reserved | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | |
| 1 | SHA-1 | MUST NOT | RECOMMENDED | RFC 9905 updated this entry: MUST NOT be used when creating DS records. |
| 2 | SHA-256 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | |
| 3 | GOST R 34.11-94 (deprecated) | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | Retired by RFC 9906. |
| 4 | SHA-384 | MAY | RECOMMENDED | |
| 5 | GOST R 34.11-2012 | MAY | MAY | |
| 6 | SM3 | MAY | MAY |
DNSKEY flags: 256 means the zone key bit is set; 257 means zone key plus the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit, which DNS hosts such as Cloudflare use for the key signing key (KSK) that the DS record points to. RFC 4034 says validators must not treat the SEP bit differently; it is only a hint.
do=1) flag.Read why a domain returns SERVFAIL after a DNS host or registrar change in Fix DNSSEC SERVFAIL (broken chain of trust), and set up inbound SMTP DANE with DNSSEC for Microsoft 365 with DNSSEC and SMTP DANE in Exchange Online. Look up any other record type with DNS Lookup, compare resolvers with the DNS Propagation Checker and check mail records with the MX Record Lookup and MTA-STS Checker.
AD stands for Authenticated Data. A validating resolver sets it only when it considers every record in the answer authentic (RFC 4035 section 3.2.3), and RFC 6840 says it should only set it when the query asked for DNSSEC data or the AD bit. This tool asks Cloudflare with the DNSSEC OK flag, so AD=1 means Cloudflare validated the answer.
Validating resolvers such as Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 return SERVFAIL when DNSSEC validation fails, while resolvers that do not validate still return the records. If a query works with checking disabled (dig +cd) but fails without it, DNSSEC is misconfigured, most often because the DS at the registrar no longer matches the keys of the current DNS host.
DNSKEY records hold the zone's public keys and are published by your DNS host in your zone. The DS record is a hash of one of those keys and is published in the parent zone (for example .com) through your registrar. The DS is what links your zone into the chain of trust.
Not by itself. It recomputes DS digests in your browser and checks RRSIG dates and key tags, but the cryptographic signature checks are done by Cloudflare's validating resolver, which this tool reports through the AD flag and SERVFAIL responses.
No, plan to move off it. RFC 9905 says RSASHA1 (5) and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 (7) must not be used for new DNSKEY, RRSIG or DS records, and that operators of validating resolvers must treat them as unsupported, which can make a zone signed only with them insecure. The IANA registry lists algorithms 8 (RSASHA256), 13 (ECDSAP256SHA256) and 15 (ED25519) and DS digest type 2 (SHA-256) as RECOMMENDED.
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